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Abstract
Many physical and social phenomena are embedded within networks of interdependencies,
the so-called ‘context’ of these phenomena. In network analysis, this type of process is typically
modeled as a network autocorrelation model. Parameter estimates and inferences based on
autocorrelation models, hinge upon the chosen specification of weight matrix , the elements
of which represent the influence pattern present in the network In this paper I discuss how social
influence processes can be incorporated in the specification of . Theories of social influence
center around ‘communication’ and ‘comparison’; it is discussed how these can be
operationalized in a network analysis context. Starting from that, a series of operationalizations
of W is discussed. Finally, statistical tests are presented that allow an analyst to test various
specifications against one another or pick the best fitting model from a set of models. 
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1. Introduction
Many physical and social phenomena are embedded within networks of
interdependencies, the so-called ‘context’ of these phenomena. In determining their
opinions and behavior, in accordance with the constraints and possibilities imposed by
the network, actors are assumed to be responsive to the contextual cues provided by the
opinions and behavior of significant others. By appropriately taking into account the
opinions and behaviors displayed by their significant others, actors thus establish their
own behavior. In the literature, this influence process has been labeled ‘contagion’ (cf.
Leenders, 1995, 1997).
Of course, opinions and behavior are not solely determined by those of others
(interaction), but also by reaction to various other constraints and opportunities granted
by the social system (local effects). In sociology, this type of process is typically
modeled as an autocorrelation model1 of the form
or
, .
Parameter estimates and inferences based on such autocorrelation models hinge
upon the chosen specification of weight matrix W. This matrix represents the influence
process assumed to be present in the network and can be operationalized in many
different ways. W is supposed to represent the theory a researcher has about the
structure of the influence processes in the network. Since any conclusion drawn on the
1. Autocorrelation of either a variable (or error term) is the situation where the
observations of variables (or error terms) for different actors are not independent
over time, through space, or across a network. 
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basis of autocorrelation models is conditional upon the specification of W, the scarcity
of attention and justification researchers pay to the chosen operationalization of W is
striking and alarming. This is especially so, since different specifications of W
typically lead to different empirical results.
In this paper, I attempt to provide researchers with an understanding of various
specifications of influence structure W. When specifying W, four steps need to be
taken. First, the researcher has to decide whether social influence occurs through the
autocorrelation of the dependent variable, through the autocorrelation of disturbances,
or through a combination of the two. In Section 2 I describe the substantive difference
between these two approaches and present the models that accompany them. Second,
the researcher decides on which mechanism governs social influence: communication
or comparison (Section 4). Third, a choice is made about which alters exert influence
on ego and which alters don’t. In other words, this is a choice about which elements of
W are zero and which are non-zero. In the fourth step, for the non-zero elements of W,
the researcher determines how much influence is exerted. These last two steps are
discussed in Sections 5 and 6. Finally, in Section 7 I present some statistical tests that
can help a researcher make a choice between rival models.
2. Network autocorrelation models
Let   be a -vector of values of an endogenous variable for  actors making
up a network and let  denote a  -matrix of values for the  actors on 
covariates (including an optional row of 1’s for the constant term). I will refer to  as
the dependent variable. In determining his opinion, ego takes into account the opinions
of his significant others. These significant others make up i’s frame of reference. The
opinion of some alters carry more weight to ego than those of others. This is denoted by
‘nearness,’ referring to the extent to which alter’s opinions and beliefs are emulated by
ego. In mathematical terms,  is related to a weighted combination of the  of other
actors. If these weights are given in the -matrix , then  is related to  . An
entry  of  denotes the influence actor2 j has on actor i; the nearer j is to i, the
larger  . So   is written as3
.
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The strength of the influence if i’s alters on i is thus determined by the weights in
the ith row of W. In matrix notation:
(1)
where  and  is a scalar (Anselin, 1982; Doreian, 1981;
Griffith, 1976; Haining, 1978; Mead, 1967; Whittle, 1954). This model represents
contagion in a straightforward fashion: ego’s opinion is a weighted version of the
opinions of his alters. 
In most cases both interaction and local effects play a role in the influence process.
For example, two organizations may compete for market share, thus revealing
between-organization effects (interaction); but they will also react to the general
availability of demand, revealing local effects to exogenous factors. Similarly, ego’s
voting behavior may be influenced by discussing matters with friends (interaction), but
will often also depend on ego’s status, income, education, and so forth (local effects).
Here, (1) is of limited utility and is extended by including covariates:
(2)
where it is assumed that the error terms are normally distributed with zero means and
equal variances; so . The difference between interaction and local effects
is reflected by the difference between the autocorrelation part in the equations
(containing ) and the exogenous part (containing ) . Ord (1975) terms model (2)
the regressive-autoregressive model; Doreian (1989b) calls it the network effects model.
The model has been studied by, among others, Doreian (1981; Doreian et al., 1984).
When  the model reduces to the standard regression equation ,
while for  the purely spatial model (1) is obtained. 
2. In some parts of the literature,  is used to denote the influence of i on j. In order
to preclude confusion, I will systematically transform W, so that all  ’s in this
paper can unambiguously be interpreted as j’s influence on i. Also, see Section 6.
3. In social network analysis, standard usage is to exclude the relation from an actor to
himself (loops), thus =0. However, the inclusion of loops can be theoretically
meaningful. The effect of actor i on   should then be included.
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An alternative way to incorporate both local and interaction effects is the network
disturbances model:
(3)
This model has been studied by, among others, Doreian (1980), Dow et al. (1982),
Loftin and Ward (1983), Ord (1975), and White et al. (1981). Due to their similarity to
time series models, (2) has also been labeled a SAR (spatial autoregressive) model, and
(3) an SMA (spatial moving average) model (e.g., Mur 1999).
Sometimes one may expect two regimes  to be present. Such a model is
(Doreian, 1989a,b)
.
Analogously this can be done in the case of disturbance autocorrelation:
See Brandsma and Ketellapper (1979) and Dow (1984) for a discussion of this model.
A natural generalization combining network effects and network disturbances is
(Doreian, 1982; Rietveld and Wintershaven, 1998):
(4)
Of course,  is allowed. Anselin (1988: 34-35) studies (4) as a general family
of autocorrelation models.4 An overview of some network autocorrelation models is
given by Doreian (1989b) and Leenders (1995, 1997). An overview and discussion of
related network models is given in Marsden and Friedkin (1993).
The substantive choice between modeling contagion through either autocorrelating
the dependent term or the disturbance term reflects a theoretical difference of how
4. In fact, Anselin’s approach is more general, as he allows , where 
may be heteroskedastic and is allowed to depend on covariates.
yX b e + =
er We u + = u N 0 s2I , ( ) ~
W
y r1W1y r2W2yX bee N 0 s2I , ( ) ~ , ++ + =
yX b e + =
er 1W1er 2W2euu N 0 s2I , () . ~ , + + =
y r1W1yX b e + + =
er 2W2euu N 0 s2I , () . ~ + =
W1 W2 =
u N 0 W , ( ) ~ W6
contagion is supposed to take place.5 The opinion an actor would display in the absence
of social influence is an actor’s intrinsic opinion (Leenders, 1995). In both (2) and (3)
an actor’s intrinsic opinion is represented by , when  is equal to zero. In
specification (2), ego builds his own opinion both on his intrinsic opinion and on the
opinion of his alters. For instance, ego’s political preference would be a function of
both ego’s socio-economic status, education, and income (intrinsic opinion) and the
political views expressed by his family, neigbors, and colleagues (contagion).
Together, these effects then simultaneously determine ego’s political stance.
Alternatively, there may be situations in which ego initially only bases his stance on his
intrinsic opinion; his status, education, and income initially determine ego’s political
views. As ego then observes his significant others to deviate from their intrinsic
opinions, ego decides to adapt to their deviation. For instance, ego may find his alters
to be more on the left-hand or right-hand side of the political spectrum than their status,
education, and income would prescribe. With his alters leaning more towards the left
(right) than expected, ego also is inclined to alter his view towards the left (right). In
this case, ego does not take the absolute value of the opinion of his alters as a
benchmark, but the deviation from their supposed (intrinsic) opinion. The mechanism
of adaptation to deviation from the intrinsic opinion, rather than to opinions themselves
is, in a statistical context, reflected by autocorrelation of residuals. The residuals 
capture latent forces that push an actor’s opinion away from his intrinsic standpoint; it
is this type of process that is captured by specification (3). 
A model of contagion of deviations is appropriate in at least three situations. First,
the deviation may represent insecurity, uncertainty, or risk. When uncertainty is high,
making it difficult for actors to assess the ‘right’ opinion or ‘right’ behavior, actors are
expected to watch others and observe how others deal with this uncertainty and mimic
their adaptive action. Similarly, if actors cannot observe all variables thought to be
relevant to the formation of their opinion, ego will adapt to this lack of information by
considering how his significant others adapt to this lack.6 Finally, when actors do know
all the relevant factors, but are not sure as to the relative and behavioral importance of
5. Anselin and Bera (1998: 247) discuss the substantive basis for the choice between
the two approaches in a geographical setting.
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them, they can take the educated guesses of significant others into account.
Autocorrelation model (1) is highly stylized, representing an extreme form of
contagion. It supposes behavior to be fully dependent on interaction, void of any effects
intrinsic to the actors in the network. It can caricaturingly be termed a ‘lemming’
model. It is hard to think of situations in which this model would be substantively
appropriate. One case would be when modeling the behavior of members of a sect,
where people are stripped of their individuality and are forced into group behavior.
Alternatively, this model could be appropriate for modeling situations so unfamiliar to
actors, that they can not (or will or dare not) rely on their own experiences,
background, or routines for behavioral direction, but fully rely on the behavior of
others in determining their own best behavior. 
3. Why the specification of W is important
When working with any autocorrelation model, the chosen specification of W is of
vital importance. The first reason network autocorrelation models are used is for
estimating  or . Many researches aim at estimating  in the situation of (possibly)
interdependent variables. In this fashion, the autocorrelation model is used to remove
bias due to the interdependence of units from OLS estimates of . Various procedures
exist, an overview of which can be found in Anselin (1988) and Leenders (1995). The
estimation procedure with the best overall performance undoubtedly is the Maximum
Likelihood estimation procedure. This procedure has been the prefered method of
estimation for over two decades and is the default procedure in the available
commercial software packages for network (or spatial) autocorrelation models. The
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimators (as do almost all alternative estimators)
explicitly incorporate weight matrix W. Change W, and get different estimates. The
difference can be substantial.
A second reason autocorrelation models are employed is for testing purposes. One
may want to test the statistical significance of particular parameters or simply test for
6. Likewise, from a statistical point of view, when important variables are not included
in X, disturbance term autocorrelation may arise. Also, autocorrelation in
disturbance terms may also arise when linear relationships between the variables are
assumed, but when in fact they are nonlinear.
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the presence of autocorrelation. In the latter case, there are two classes of tests. The
first class of tests is used when the underlying distribution of the autocorrelated
phenomenon is unknown, or when observations are measured on a nominal or ordinal
scale. This class consists of statistics such as Moran’s I, Geary’s c, and the join-count
statistic. These do not involve weight matrix W at all, and are therefore unaffected by
any specific form chosen for W. The downside to these tests is that, although their null
hypothesis is that of absence of autocorrelation, their alternative hypothesis is left
vague. It is therefore unclear what the rejection of the null hypothesis really means. The
second class consists of tests that involve distributional information and includes,
among others, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, the Likelihood Ratio test (LR), the
Wald test (Wald), and Moran’s I as reformulated by Cliff and Ord (1973; Tiefelsdorf,
1998). In modern literature on autocorrelation models, the LM, LR, and Wald tests are
the most commonly used. Since these tests explicitly incorporate W, any inference is
conditional upon the chosen W. A parameter may lose or attain statistical significance
when inference is based on an alternative specification of W, while still using the same
dataset. Change W and draw a different conclusion.
The last reason to use an autocorrelation model is to test theories of social
influence in a particular dataset. In this situation, the specification of W should follow
naturally from the theory at hand. Change one’s theory, change W. 
In conclusion, regardless of the purpose served by applying a network
autocorrelation model, virtually any conclusion depends on the specification of W. It is
therefore of vital importance to have justification for the W applied in the research. 
4. Theories of social influence
Social influence occurs when an actor adapts his behavior, attitude, or belief, to the
behaviors, attitudes, or beliefs of other actors in the social system. It does not matter
whether alter’s influence on ego’s behavior is intentional or unintentional and is not
restricted to direct communication. A precondition for social influence to occur is the
availability to ego of information about the attitudes or behavior of other actors. In this
paper, social influence is viewed as a dyadic process: ego adapts his behavior to that of
alter, leading them to behave similarly.7 In the literature, different terms are used to9
describe the same thing. In particular, the term contagion is often used to describe the
social influence processes dealt with in this paper (e.g., Leenders, 1995, 1997).
Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, I will use the terms contagion, social
influence, and influence interchangeably, each is taken to mean the same thing.
Sociological literature contains many different theories of social influence. Most of
these are couched in terms of the idea that the attitudes and opinions of significant
others influence the way in which a person comes to view a situation. The opinions of
alters are seen as an appropriate standard against which ego evaluates his own opinion.
In other words, when forming his own opinion, ego uses other actors as his frame of
reference and takes their opinions into account. In the remainder of the paper, I will use
both the terms alter or significant other to refer to a member of an actor’s frame of
reference.
Within the realm of social influence theory, the notion of a frame of reference has
crystalized around two processes (Figure 1).
• Communication: actors use actors with whom they are directly tied as their
frame of reference.
• Comparison: actors use actors they feel similar to as their frame of reference.
** Figure 1**
4.1. Communication
Communication refers to social influence through direct contact between ego and
alter. The more frequent and vivid the communication between ego and alter, the more
likely it is that ego will adopt alter’s ideas and beliefs. Through discussing matters with
7. Consequently, if ego and alter express similar opinions after both watching the
same television program, this is not a result of social influence between them.
However, if alter’s opinion changes after watching a TV program, this could cause
alter to adhere to and express an opinion that deviates from his intrinsic opinion.
The network disturbances model then allows  i to adapt his opinion as well.
Although the direct influence of the TV show on j does not fall within my definition
of a network social influence process, the adaptation of i’s opinion based on j’s
adaptation does.10
alter, ego comes to an understanding of an issue and adds new information to his own.
Homans’ work (Homans, 1950, 1961) provides a theoretical foundation for
contagion through communication. Classical early empirical work was performed by
Festinger (Festinger et al., 1950; Festinger and Kelly, 1951) and Lazersfeld (Lazersfeld
et al., 1948; Berelson et al., 1954). Lazarsfeld et al. (1948) for instance argue that
people rely on personal contacts to help them select relevant arguments in political
affairs. Ego trusts the judgement and evaluation of those who are respected around him.
Personal obligations and trust are more powerful influences than radio or newspapers.
Berelson et al. (1954) show that political preferences of friends and co-workers
strongly determine ego’s preference and that these alters also affect the strength of
conviction with which actor’s vote preference is held. Accordingly, they show that
young voters have a very strong tendency to vote like their fathers. Baerveldt and
Snijders (1994), studying network effects on cultural behavior, find petty crime
offences amongst pupils to be correlated with the number of offences committed by
their friends. Most studies of social influence assume communication to be the
underlying process.
4.2. Comparison
The other process of contagion is social comparison. In searching for a social
identity, ego ascribes to himself those characteristics or feelings that alters would
ascribe to him if they would have the same information at their disposal (cf. Bem,
1972; Tajfel, 1972). Putting it differently, ego compares himself to those alters whom
he considers similar to him in relevant respects, asking himself ‘what would another
person do if he were in my shoes?.’ Ego perceives (or assesses) alter’s behavior and
assumes that behavior to be the ‘correct’ behavior for ‘a-person-like-me’ or for ‘a-
person-in-a-position-like-mine.’ Burt (1987) argues that comparison is triggered if
actors are in competition with one another. By comparison they evaluate their relative
adequacy.8
Role playing and imitation are similar to comparison; comparison establishes a
role-playing frame as alters are imitated or roles are emulated. 11
4.3. Attitudes vs. behavior
In studies on organizations, and in political science in particular, much interest
exists in contagion processes. The argument is that if contagion is strong within a
group, the likelihood of similar behavior increases, leading to an increase in the group’s
power. However, there is an important difference between similarity of beliefs and
interests and similarity of behavior (Mizruchi, 1989, 1990; Wickes, 1969). Behavior is
not solely determined by a set of attitudes and beliefs, but also by restrictions with
which the actor is confronted. A change in some of the attitudes and beliefs does not
automatically lead to changes in behavior. Similarity in beliefs, therefore, does not
necessarily lead to similarity in behavior. Moreover, actors with different beliefs might
well behave similarly (Merton, 1936).
In the communication approach to contagion, information is exchanged about an
issue at hand, uncertainty is expressed, past experiences are shared, and actors learn
from each others’ mistakes, leading to a unison of opinions, attitudes, and beliefs, but
not necessarily to conformity in behavior. Comparison, on the other hand, which may
take place among non-adjacent actors, is explictly based on role playing and the
copying of behavior. Moreover, actors who are not directly tied to one another can rely
only on observed behavior, as they cannot discuss with alter which attitudes underly his
behavior. 
In short, communication yields similarity of beliefs, but not necessarily of
behavior, whereas comparison leads to similarity in behavior, but not necessarily in
underlying beliefs. 
The consequence of this difference is important because similarity of behavior are
easily observed by a researcher, but similarity of beliefs and attitudes are not. The
methodological problems related to this will not further be discussed in this paper.
8. Burt’s argument is that comparison is used by actors in order to gain strategic
advantage. By comparing himself to alter, ego can invent and adopt innovations that
would make ego more attractive than alter as the object or source of relations (Burt,
1987: 1291). Naturally, this only makes sense for actors who occupy similar
positions in the social system.12
5. Operationalizing social influence
5.1. Operationalizing communication
The common approach to operationalizing a communication process in social
network analysis is through cohesion. Cohesion incorporates the number, length, and
strength of the paths connecting actors, leading to concepts such as cliques (Mokken,
1979), k-plexes (Seidman and Foster, 1978), and k-cores (Doreian and Woodard, 1994,
Seidman, 1983). It is then tested whether actors who belong to the same subgroup,
clique, k-plex, or k-core are more alike than actors in different groups. If they are, this
is attributed to communication. However, when  there is no guarantee that actors,
belonging to the same cohesive subgroup, are in communication with each other. In
this paper I therefore restrict cohesion to actors who are directly tied. Cohesion then
assumes actors who are directly linked to be(come) more similar than actors who are
not linked directly.
5.2. Operationalizing comparison
Comparison is most often operationalized by the concept of equivalence.
Equivalent actors are similarly embedded in the network. The most widespread
conceptualization of equivalence in autocorrelation models is structural equivalence9
(Lorrain and White, 1971). Actors are structurally equivalent if they have exactly the
same ties to and from all actors. Actors need not be directly tied in order to be
structurally equivalent. They may never communicate and may not even know of each
other’s existence. 
In practice, actors are seldom exactly structurally equivalent and the equivalence
criterion is relaxed to measure the extent to which actors are structurally equivalent. A
common measure is as follows. Construct vector  by stacking the ith row and column
9. There are many alternative types of equivalence, some of them substantively being
better suited to capture processes of comparison. However, as I discuss elsewhere
(Leenders, 1995), structural equivalence is the most practical measure for the
purpose. Moreover, with respect to capturing influence processes, structural
equivalence measures correlate highly with alternative conceptualizations of
equivalence. A related discussion is found in a highly recommended paper by
Borgatti and Everett (1992).
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of adjacency matrix A, and   by stacking the jth row and column of A. Euclidean
distance   is a measure of structural equivalence,
equaling 0 for exactly equivalent actors and  for completely nonequivalent actors
( being the number of actors in the network). This number is then standardized by
dividing by . For use in network autocorrelation models, I propose a slightly
different approach. Define  and  as before and define , where 1 is a
 vector of ones. The Euclidean distance  now is a measure of structural
similarity or proximity rather than distance. Again this measure is standardized by
dividing by . A value of 0 represents exact non-equivalence, a value of 1 exact
structural equivalence. I will come back to this in 5.5. 
Since the comparison argument states that actors involve in copying each other’s
behavior, actors should be able to observe each other. One can not derive from a
network structure alone whether actors, who are not directly tied, know or can observe
each other. It is likely that the shorter the path between two actors, the higher the
probability that they know of each other and can observe each other’s behavior. It
therefore makes sense to restrict equivalence to actors who are proximate, say at a
sociometric distance less then or equal to three.10
In analyses of empirical data, cohesion and structural equivalence often yield
similar results since, in order to establish whether actors are structurally equivalent, one
only needs to consider to whom they are directly tied. A change in network structure at
a sociometric distance of at least two from both actors does not affect their structural
equivalence. Thus, two actors cannot be structurally equivalent if they have a
sociometric distance of more than two between them.11 Thus, structural equivalence
and cohesion are often strongly correlated. 
10.Sociometric distance 3 (friend-of-a-friend-of-a-friend) intuitively seems a useful
threshold for approximating awareness. As a practical test, the reader might
consider of how many friends-of-a-friend-of-a-friend-of-a-friend (sociometric
distance 4) (s)he can really assess opinions, attitudes or behavior. A researcher may
also consider setting the threshold at distance 2 (friend-of-a-friend).
11.There is one exception to this rule: isolates (nodes that have no ties to and from
other actors) are also mutually structurally equivalent.
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5.3. Communication or comparison?
Although communication and comparison reflect theoretically fundamentally
different mechanisms of social influence, they are not easily separable empirically.
They are different, but not disjoint. The communication argument relates similarity to
the direct ties between actors: if adjacent actors are observed to be(come) alike, this is
attributed to communication. The comparison argument, on the other hand, relates
similarity to the fact that actors are correspondingly embedded in the social structure: if
equivalent actors are observed to be(come) alike, this is attributed to comparison.
However, contrasting the similarity of adjacent actors with the similarity of structurally
equivalent pairs does not establish whether similarity is a result of either
communication or comparison. Actors  who are directly tied can become alike by both
communication and comparison. Besides this, they can become alike by
communicating with a mutual friend (indirect communication) or by comparing
themselves to the same alter (indirect comparison).12 It is usually not possible to
empirically distinguish among these four processes (communication, comparison,
indirect communication, indirect comparison) when it is only observed that adjacent
actors are or become alike. Even though in some cases it may be possible to
theoretically rule out one or two of them, it will hardly ever be possible to discard all
but one. 
Actors who are equivalently located in the network may become alike through
comparison, indirect communication or indirect comparison. Equivalent actors can be
adjacent and become alike through communication. Again, these effects can usually
not be distinguished. 
The problem of distinguishing between communication and comparison has led
several researchers to arbitrarily discard either communication or comparison as a
contagion mechanism and strictly adhere to the other.13 It is more interesting, however,
to ask whether it is possible to determine in advance whether communication or
12.Indirect communication and indirect comparison are not contagion, but a
consequence of contagion. However, it appears to be impossible to formulate
practical measures of contagion that exclude all indirect flows of contagion. 
13.Indirect communication and indirect comparison are seldom addressed.15
comparison is driving contagion. Unfortunately, in the literature not much is known
about the relative prominence of either of the two processes in various situations. Burt
and Doreian (1982) find support for both the communication and comparison
arguments in separate analyses of the same dataset. Galaskiewicz and Wasserman
(1989) also find proof of comparison, as they find that organizational decision makers
mimic the behavior of other decision makers. However, they also report that managers
are especially likely to mimic behavior of the organizations they are directly linked to.
Comparison or communication? 
An interesting empirical debate centers around the diffusion of innovations study
of Coleman et al. (1957, 1966) who show that communication was driving the adoption
of a new drug among physicians in the Midwest. Burt (1987) reanalyzes the data and
concludes comparison rather than communication to be the source of contagion. In
turn, Marsden and Podolny (1990) find hardly any evidence of contagion at all, neither
communication nor comparison. Finally, Strang and Tuma (1993) show effects of both
communication and comparison! This sequence of contradictory results on the same
dataset certainly highlights that the empirical distinction between the two processes is
not straightforward and that they may be strongly interrelated. Although, to my
knowledge, this is the only dataset that has evoked such major controversy, it is not
likely an exceptional one.
Sometimes an attempt is made to test communication against comparison by
testing for equivalence after first controlling for cohesion, the idea being that cohesion
has already picked up communication effects, so equivalence will only estimate
comparison. This, however, is not correct. Cohesion will still summarize direct and
indirect communication and comparison effects between adjacent actors, and
equivalence will then summarize comparison and indirect communication among non-
adjacent actors. In some cases, it may be possible to argue on theoretical grounds
whether communication or comparison is driving contagion, but even then it will most
often still be impossible to empirically test one against the other. 
5.4. An alternative distinction: adjacency versus non-adjacency
Only in rare cases is it possible to strictly (theoretically or empirically) distinguish16
between the two types of processes, attempting to do so in other cases only yields
spurious results. Therefore, I will not make the empirical distinction between
communication and comparison, but make a distinction between contagion  among
directly tied actors and contagion among actors who are not directly tied (Figure 2).
** Figure 2**
Contagion among directly tied actors picks up both direct and indirect
communication and comparison effects. Contagion among actors who are not directly
tied summarizes direct and indirect comparison and indirect communication effects.
The greater the sociometric distance between the actors, the smaller the effect of
indirect communication and comparison, thus the stronger the direct comparison
component. 
The distinction between contagion through direct and indirect ties does not resolve
the issue of communication versus comparison entirely. It does, however, isolate the
effects of contagion through direct communication,14 which is one of the two major
theoretical explanations of contagion. Table 1 summarizes the argument.
** Table 1 **
Contagion among adjacent actors is simply operationalized by investigating
whether adjacent actors tend to share similar opinions or behavior. I propose two
different operationalizations for contagion among non-adjacent actors. In the first,
equivalence between untied actors is considered; the second considers the number of
paths of various lengths between actors.
5.5. Effects between non-adjacent actors
Structural equivalence between non-adjacent actors can be defined following
Section 5.2. Define equivalence proximity  by
14.Note, however, that it will never be possible, using only relational data, to
distinguish between influence through direct communication and influence by
comparison between adjacent actors.
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Non-adjacent actors who are exactly equivalent have proximity 1, other non-adjacent
pairs of actors have equivalence proximity between zero and one. Adjacent actors
always have proximity zero. The reasoning behind the inclusion of  in (5), is
that this term prevents equivalence being blended with adjacency. When equivalence
proximate actors are found to be similar in opinions, this is not an effect of direct
communication. Note that (5) takes into account the directionality of the tie, which is
lost in the standard formulae for structural equivalence. This means that if , but
, then the influence of i on j by direct communication is filtered out, but j can
still influence i by equivalence. Definition (5) shifts the focus to the zero relations in the
network.
An alternative approach starts from the paths between i and j. When i and j are not
directly tied but many short paths exist between them, there are many possibilities for
indirect communication. When there are relatively many long shortest paths between
actors, comparison is predominant. Again,  i and  j should be able to observe one
another, I therefore suggest considering only non-adjacent actors i and j who are at a
sociometric distance less than or equal to two or three. With , the number of
(shortest) paths15 of length two from i to j is given by entry  of . Similarly, the
number of (shortest) paths of length three from i to j is given by . The number of
(shortest) paths of length two or three is found by simply adding  and . After
having constructed the matrix with shortest path lengths, the matrix is multiplied
element-wise by , in order to set the path length between adjacent actors equal
to zero. 
It is also possible to calculate all paths between actors i and j, by determining entry
 of  and  after setting   before multiplication. This calculation needs
to be performed separately for each pair of adjacent actors. In this fashion, adjacent
15.Mathematically, the kth power of A gives k-sequences and not k-paths. However,
the paths between non-adjacent actors of length smaller than or equal to three are
exactly equal to the corresponding 2-sequences and 3-sequences. Also, for these
lengths the paths are equal to the shortest paths.
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actors are allowed to influence each other through indirect paths, but the influence
flowing through paths involving a direct link between them is filtered out.
A situation in which these approaches are especially useful is when both a factor
based on adjacency and a factor based on equivalence proximity/shortest paths is
incorporated in a model of attitudinal actor similarity. Equivalence proximity will not
absorb any of the social influence based on direct adjacency. 
6. Operationalization of weight matrix W
Social influence enters network autocorrelation models through the weight matrix
W, also called the structure matrix. Entry  represents the extent to which  is
dependent on , thus to what extent actor  influences . 
All operationalizations that follow below are ultimately based upon adjacency
matrix , with  meaning that j influences i. Different specifications of W can
represent different theoretical mechanisms of social influence. In addition, also from a
technical point of view it is important how W is specified since estimates of and tests
for the various parameters of the models all depend on the specification of W and their
properties are conditional on W.
With regard to an operationalization of W, two components play a role: the choice
for an operationalization of nearness and the choice for a particular normalization
which, given a definition of nearness, allocates influence over the network. In other
words, nearness defines which alters constitute ego’s frame of reference (zero and non-
zero cells in W), whereas the chosen normalization determines how social influence is
allocated among these alters. For instance, cohesion suggests that actors are influenced
by adjacent actors, normalization then decreases the individual strength of influence
with the number of influencers. I will first discuss the difference between row and
column normalization. Then the focus will advance to discussing ways to
operationalize nearness, since many of these were developed with a particular
normalization already in mind. 
6.1. Row versus column normalization
The influence structure in a network is represented by a weight matrix where each
row displays the influence exerted on an actor and the column displays the influence
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exerted by an actor. The normalizations discussed below do not pose restrictions on the
value of the diagonal of A.
Row normalization of adjacency matrix  gives
with , the th row sum of . Thus  denotes the number of actors to
whom  has a tie. With row normalization the same weight is attached to every outgoing
tie of , proportional to the outdegree of . If actor  has three outgoing ties, each of his
alters will have weight . An actor with only one outgoing tie will be fully
influenced by this one alter.
A straightforward, but less common variation to  is the column normalization
of :
with  representing the th column sum of . The strength of influence actor   has
over actor   now depends on the number of actors influenced by  , instead of on the
amount of actors influencing  . In row normalization every actor undergoes the same
total amount of influence from all actors: accepted influence of   by  decreases with
the number of actors influencing  . In column normalization every actor exerts the same
total amount of influence on all actors: exerted influence of   on   decreases with the
number of actors  influences. The important differences between row- and column-
normalization are presented in Table 2.
** Table 2 **
Note that the weight matrix resulting from either row or column normalization is likely
to become asymmetric since , even though the original matrix may have
been symmetric.
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6.2. Influence between adjacent actors: Cohesion
A non-normalized weight matrix alternative to  was introduced by French
(1956) as
.
By adding a one to the numerator the effect an actor has on his own position, termed
resistance, is taken into account. When four actors try to influence i, each of them only
has weight 1/5.
So far I have not made a distinction in the power or abilities of actors in influencing
others. These abilities, indicated by the resources available to actors, can be
incorporated into a weight matrix by allowing actors to have different resources (Hoede
1979):
If every actor has the same resources, , the Hoede matrix
equals French’s weight matrix. One difficulty with  is the assumption that the
resources of the actors are known a priori, requiring the researcher to find a way of
measuring/postulating the values of . Applying  with  yields the control
matrix as used by Stokman and Van den Bos (1992). An alternative to  is
.
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6.3. Influence between non-adjacent actors: Equivalence
Two actors are structurally equivalent to the extent that their structural distance is
small. These distances, denoted here by , can be used to construct W matrices. An
example of this is given in Burt and Doreian (1982: 117, 125) by
where
with v a constant,16   is set to zero and . Burt and Doreian employ
 to model how interests expressed by scientists in a scientific journal are converted
into a journal norm. The journal norm is defined as the level of interest in the journal
expected of scientists because of their structural position in ‘invisible colleges.’ Weight
 represents the extent to which actor j is the only other member of the college that
i perceives to be his structural peer (Burt and Doreian, 1982: 125).
In 5.5, I proposed an alternative approach to equivalence, termed equivalence
proximity. The operationalization of equivalence proximity excludes effects of direct
communication, by assigning zero proximity to adjacent actors. This measure can be
transformed into a weight matrix by normalizing the matrix with equivalence
proximities. Since the matrix is asymmetric for an asymmetric , the  device of
asymmetrizing it by   is unnecessary.
6.4. Influence between non-adjacent actors: indirect paths
16.The magnitude of  represents the extent to which ego is conservative in adjusting
his interests to those held by his significant others. Values of  much larger than 1
indicate that ego takes into account only the interests of his closest alters. Values
near zero indicate that ego’s interests are affected by nearly everyone in the
network. See Stevens (1957, 1962) for the theory behind .
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A second route into modeling influence between non-adjacent actors starts from
the indirect paths between them. Contagion is then considered to flow from alter to ego
through ties with third actors. In 5.5 two ways of measuring these paths were discussed.
In the first, the adjacency matrix is squared or cubed and entries for adjacent actors are
set to zero afterwards. In the second, entries  of  and  for adjacent actors are
determined separately after setting  (for only this particular pair ) in the
original adjacency matrix. After calculating , , and , these can be
transformed into weight matrices employing any of the transformations  - .
6.5. Other specifications
Numerous other specifications of nearness exist, many of them emanating from the
geography literature. A straightforward measure is the actual geographic distance
between two actors, e.g., measured in miles. For a taste of geographic approaches, try
Cliff and Ord (1973, 1981), Loftin and Ward (1983), and Bavaud (1998).
Unfortunately, many of the specifications in the geography literature are hard to
translate into a social network context. Other specifications, within the realm of social
network analysis, can be built upon the numerous (social) distance measures, status
scores, prominence measures, and so forth, that have been developed in the social
network literature over the years.17 Many of these can be seen as special cases of
cohesion or equivalence.
A useful measure for the study of policy and power networks is formulated as
follows. Define  as (political) resources available to actor . These might include
resources  can draw from the political organization he is part of. Part of ’s resources
might also be available to , for instance through  j’s membership of the same
organization, denote these shared resources by  (note that  does not necessarily
17.Social distances are typically calculated from the presence or absence of links
among actors or from the difference between a profile of characteristics of an actor
and his perception of other actors’ profiles on the same characteristics. Distances
can be calculated from status scores or prominence scores by viewing the status or
prominence of an actor (however derived) as an actor attribute. Differences in these
scores can then be used as the basis of the weights in a weight matrix. 
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equal ). Next, introduce a measure of nearness between  and , , representing
how difficult it is for j to claim i’s resources. This measure may be based on adjacency,
social distance, role equivalence, and so forth. An appropriate weight matrix is
where  and  are parameters. Weight  may be interpreted as the extent to which
’s resources can be ‘claimed’18 by . The weight matrix is normalized
straightforwardly. The measure is based on an object-oriented approach to network
analysis, that has become increasingly popular over the recent years (among others
Snijders, 1996; Stokman and Van Oosten, 1994; Zeggelink, 1993, 1994). It also fits well
within the theory of core/adjoint networks (Leenders, 1995: 33-36). An adjoint network
typically represents an interest group or corporate actor. A member of this network
‘inherits’ part of his resources from the resources of this corporate actor; the rest of his
resources are ‘private.’ As an example, imagine an actor from an interest group who
becomes a member of the political decision taking core, perhaps a leader of a labor union
who is also affiliated with a political party. This leader now can exert more influence on
both the party and the union by drawing on the resources offered to him by his
membership to both.
An entire network consisting of core and adjoint networks should be modeled by
using different weighting mechanisms in one weight matrix, by employing multiple
weight matrices, or by a weight matrix consisting of partitions that reflect the influence
pattern within and between subgroups (Doreian, 1989a: 377-380; Leenders, 1995: 84-
91). For instance, the influence process may be driven by  in adjoint networks and
by  in the core network.
A specification known as a ‘gravity model’ can be used to incorporate the ‘size’ of
actors. For example, some organizations in an organization network, by means of their
size, power, visibility, marketing budgets, or status may be able to systematically exert
more influence on their alters than can others of smaller size, less power, or lower
18.It is assumed that i cannot use these resources as long as they are in use by j.
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status. Their weight of influence on others should thus be larger. Similarly, some
organizations, such as governmental or other politically representative organizations
may be required to systematically be more open to societal influence than others. This
can be modeled by
where  is the ‘size’ of influencer j,  is the ‘size’ of influencee i, and  captures
the facility with which j can influence i. This measure traces back to Carey (1858) and
is still in popular use (Nijkamp, 1997; De Vries et al., 2000) and varied upon (e.g., Boyle
and Flowerdew, 1997).
An alternative influence structure reflects a discontinuous pattern where
connectedness ‘skips over’ the first connected actor. In this sense,  and  are
connected if  has a relationship to  and  has a relationship to . This model yields a
new adjacency matrix  with elements
, for  (6)
and a weight matrix can be constructed according to any of the methods discussed above
(e.g., Brandsma and Ketellapper, 1979). This type of adjacency matrix may be useful for
the study of kinship or heredity networks. Mathematically (6) is equal to dichotomizing
, if , . A row normalized weight matrix is
A different way of specifying influence incorporates the concept of ‘thresholds of
influence.’ Let  denote some metric representing the nearness between i and j. In
modeling inter-municipal influences in labor market-policies, Van Dam and Weesie
(1991) use the following specification, employing only two levels of influence
separated by a nearness-threshold 
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Getis (1984) follows a similar approach. An alternative is to allow  to be a
continuous function of . An example is
Weights can also be taken as an exponential function of distance (Fotheringham et al.,
1998; Talen and Anselin, 1998; White et al., 1981). In fact, any non-increasing function
of distance can be applied. 
In this section, many different operationalizations for the weight of the relation
between two actors have been discussed. Yet other specifications are discussed by
Friedkin (1998), starting from a social psychological point of view.
It is clear that in empirical situations the choice for a certain matrix W is not at all
obvious. There are an infinity of possible representations. The choice for a certain
weight matrix is often debatable. Weight matrix W allows a researcher to choose a set
of weights that are appropriate from prior considerations. This allows great flexibility
in defining the structure of influence in networks. Further, if different hypotheses are
proposed about the degree of influence between units, alternative sets of weights might
be used to investigate these hypotheses. This will depend on the study at hand. The
generally correct weight-matrix does not exist. Only substantive knowledge can lend
guidance to possible appropriate specifications.
7. Statistical tests on the weight structure
Sometimes the story ends here. In that case, the researcher has been able to
construct an appropriate W-matrix, consistent with his or her theoretical beliefs, and
can proceed to the host of analyses that have been developed for working with network
autocorrelation models. However, in two cases, an additional step is needed. In the
first, the researcher was able to narrow down the large set of potential weight matrices
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to only a few, but not to one single one, and is not able to distinguish between them on
theoretical grounds. In the second case, the researcher has narrowed down the possible
influence structures to one and wants to test his theory, as embodied by a specific
weight matrix, against alternative influence structures, represented by alternative W’s.
In both cases, statistical procedures are required to test various specifications against
one another. Yet another approach is to try to estimate directly the elements of W.
However, if theoretical considerations have not enabled the researcher to make a
justified choice of W-matrix, they will certainly unlikely provide the researcher with
enough guidance for specifying an estimation model for the ’s sensibly. In addition,
the statistical issues connected to such an estimation are still largely unsolved, so the
researcher has to make too many assumptions to make the likelihood functions
tractable. 
In Section 7.1 I will consider the situation in which the researcher considers one
structure as his null hypothesis and wants to test that against alternative structures. In
Section 7.2 the situation is considered in which in series of influence structures are
equally likely from a theoretical point of view, and the final choice between them has
to be made on statistical grounds.
7.1. When a null hypothesis is available
For ease of presentation, I will focus on the network effects model (2). The
competing hypotheses  and , which can represent different influence structures
(in terms of a W matrix) as well as different explanatory variables (the ’s) can be
expressed as:
(7)
where  and  are two -weight matrices, and  and  represent
 and -matrices of explanatory variables, some of which may be
included in both  and ;  need not be equal to . 
Classical testing procedures are invalid here. Usually, the competing formulations
in (7) cannot be considered as limited forms of a more general expression, or as
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restrictions on a general model (conditional upon the latter being true). Therefore,
traditional tests do not fully apply in this situation (Anselin, 1984). 
The test of one formulation against one or more alternatives, used to falsify the
original specification, is performed by using tests for non-nested hypotheses. After a
brief discussion of two approaches to testing non-nested hypotheses, I will focus more
closely on a third approach.
A first approach is the so-called modified likelihood ratio test. For this test,
Maximum Likelihood estimation of both models under their respective null hypotheses
( and ) is performed and compared to its expected value under the null
hypothesis, . In other words, it involves the estimation of the alternative model,
with the null hypothesis assumed correct, using pseudo maximum likelihood
estimation. Anselin (1984) provided the appropriate Cox-statistic for (7) and concluded
that its variance is mathematically intractable. As a result, this approach is not
recommended for network autocorrelation. A second approach, popular in spatial
sciences, involves the use of instrumental variable (IV) estimators. This approach is
sensitive to the choice of instruments. The disadvantage of applying IV-estimators for
the testing purpose at hand, is that, in order for the competing formulations to be fully
comparable, the same set of instruments should be used for all. However, as is obvious
in the formulation of (7), one wants to allow for the inclusion of (possibly totally)
different covariates with different W-matrices. In that case, using the same set of
instruments for all specifications may be far from optimal, both theoretically and
statistically. Therefore, I will limit myself here to simply refering to the appropriate
literature (Anselin, 1984, 1988; Ericsson, 1983; Godfrey, 1983).
Considering the problems associated with the first two approaches, I suggest using
the approach of augmented regressions. Consider again the case of testing  against
, as in (7). Null hypothesis  is not nested within , and  is not nested
within . Thus, the truth of  implies the falsity of , and vice versa. Now
consider the augmented equation
(8)
where  and  are ML estimates calculated from separate estimation of . If 
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is true, then the true value of nesting parameter  is equal to 0. It is easily shown that
 is independent of . Therefore, one can simply test whether  in
(8) by means of a conventional t-test or related tests. Test (8) is known as the J-test, since
it involves estimating nesting parameter  and model parameters   jointly. A
number of variations to (8) have been proposed, but the J-test is the easiest to use.
Although all variations are asymptotically equivalent, they tend to differ in finite
samples. From Monte Carlo simulation results, the J-test seems to be preferable with
regard to its finite sample properties (e.g., Anselin, 1986).
Three remarks are important here. First, since my focus here is on the statistical
testing of one specification against one or more alternatives, individual measures of fit
are not appropriate, as they compare the fit of a model to the fit of a null model, rather
than to the fit of a specific alternative. Second, the approach of specifying one model as
the null hypothesis and an alternative model as an alternative hypothesis is
fundamentally different from testing for the presence of network autocorrelation (i.e.
the significance of  for a given structure W). In the latter case, the null hypothesis is
that  is equal to zero, and the alternative states that  is not. Failure to reject that null
hypothesis does not necessarily mean that autocorrelation is absent, it simply means
that the presence of autocorrelation is rejected for this W-structure. In the non-nested
test, the W-matrices are not considered in isolation, but in direct relation to the specific
alternative structures for W. Similarly, rejection or non-rejection of  in (7) does not
say anything about the presence of autocorrelation in the data. It may very well be that
 and  are ‘accepted,’ but  is found to not significantly differ from zero.
Third, formulation (7) only includes two model specifications, one of which is
considered as the null hypothesis. In practical cases, one may have several alternative
hypotheses that should be tested against . In that case, one essentially has a situation
of multiple comparisons and the usual adjustments to significance levels apply. One
can also extend (8) to test  against  alternatives through
and test the hypothesis that all ’s are zero.
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7.2. When no null hypothesis is available
I now consider the situation where there is a fixed number of equally plausible
models and the analyst has no reason to prefer any of them. A test then is needed to
choose between these alternative specifications. None of the available specifications is
taken as a null hypothesis.
Initially, one may be tempted to apply J-test (8) to this problem. After all, if  is
true, then  in (8) will asymptotically converge to one. Although it might seem that
that would enable one to test the truth of  directly from (8), this is not correct. The t-
statistics for (8) are conditional on the truth of , not on the truth of . The
alternative is to then simply reverse the roles of  and  and carry out the test
again. It is possible that one of the two specifications is rejected in favor of the other
one. It, however, is also possible that both hypotheses may be rejected, or that neither
may be rejected. The reason for this is that the tests of 7.1 are tests on model
specification, and not model discrimination tests. This may not be a problem when
testing two specifications against one another, but when more specifications are
available, drawing conclusions may become very complicated and unclear. Still, this
approach is advocated by Anselin (Anselin and Can, 1986), who also devised a
qualitative approach for choosing between alternatives. 
Since no null hypothesis and alternative hypotheses are specified, it makes sense to
base the model choice upon goodness-of-fit measures. The properties of traditional
measures of fit, such as , do not directly carry over to the situation of network
autocorrelation. It therefore seems reasonable to select that model that minimizes a
quantity such as the Kullback-Leibler information criterion. This approach is
applicable to nested and non-nested hypotheses and avoids the need to carry out
multiple pairwise comparisons. Information theoretic approaches deal with measuring
the closeness of the assumed model to the true, but unknown, model, while taking into
account the trade-off between fit and parsimony of parameters. In contrast to the tests
discussed in Section 7.1, which are based on testing models against given alternative
specifications, information theoretic measures are associated with each model by itself.
Since the true model is unknown, an estimate is needed. The Akaike information
criterion (AIC), has been shown to be a useful estimate (Akaike, 1974, 1981; Judge et
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al., 1985; Sawa, 1978):
AIC =  (9)
where  is the loglikelihood at the maximum and  is a penalty function of
the number of unknown parameters in the model. The function  varies among
different versions of AIC, the most commonly specifications being  or
, with  being the number of actors in the network. Comparing the
values of AIC for all models, the minimum AIC represents the model with maximum fit.
Thus, selecting one specification from a set of specifications on a statistical basis is
really easy. First estimate all of the models separately. Take the value of the
loglikelihood (as reported by the software used for estimating the autocorrelation
models), choose a penalty function and calculate the AIC. Then pick that specification
that minimizes it. 
8. Empirical example
In this section I will provide a brief example of the statistical issues dealt with in
this paper. First I will show that the choice for an alternative specification of W, or the
choice of a network effect model versus a network disturbances model, can lead to
different statistical results. I will also show how the specification tests dicussed above
can be applied. For these purposes I reanalyze the Louisiana voting data from Doreian
(1980), in which it is argued that a spatial analysis of the data is appropriate. The
example is for illustrative purposes only. The dependent variable y is the proportion of
support in a parish for Democratic presidential candidate Kennedy at the 1960
elections. The covariates are B (percentage black in a parish), C (percentage Catholic),
U (percentage urban), and BPE (a measure of black political equality). Each of these
can be seen as predictors of electoral turnout and partisan electoralbehavior in
presidential elections. The spatial model describes the extent to which electoral
behavior is contagious between adjacent parishes. Adjacency matrix A is a simple
binary matrix describing adajcency among 64 parishes (counties).
Table 3 contains the results of four autocorrelation analyses, all containing the
same covariates (B, C, U, and BPE) and differing only in the chosen W. The OLS
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column contains the results for the non-spatial model . When applying the
network effects model, only weighting scheme  yields a statistically significant
autocorrelation parameter. When the adjacency matrix is column normalized, is based
on structural equivalence, or mimics a heredity structure, the autocorrelation parameter
loses statistical significance. Note that the parameter estimates for the covariates and,
more importantly, their statistical significance, only vary slightly over the various
influence structures.19 
**** Table 3 ***
The results for the network disturbances model are very different. Here, three out
of four influence regimes yield statistically significant autocorrelation parameters,
including  and . Again, the results for the covariates do not vary much.
**** Table 4 ***
Next, suppose the researcher has decided on substantive grounds that the network
effects is the appropriate model and wants to test the situation in which exerted
influence decreases with the number of actors influenced (row normalization) against
the situation in which accepted influence decreases with the number of actors
influencing (column normalization). Now (7) can be used to test :  against :
. Estimating (8) with  and  and  yields =.14
(.92). So,  is not rejected and the appropriateness of  can not be rejected in
favor of . 
If the researcher had narrowed down on substantive grounds the set of probable
weight structures to , , , and , but had absolutely no substantive
reason to prefer one of the others, Akaike information criterion (9) would be
appropriate. For both the network effects the network disturbances models, the
resulting order of weight matrices is , , ,  (see Table 5). The AIC
criterion can also be used to choose between competing models. In total, nine models
19.This result can not be generalized. Neither is it warranted to generalize the present
result that the statistical significance of the covariates is similar for the network
effects models and the network disturbances model. For instance, in the analyses in
Doreian (1980) statistical significance does vary over both models.
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were estimated (four network effects models, four network disturbances models, and
one non-spatial OLS model), the AIC values of which are reported in Table 5. The
penalty function used is . The four regimes with statistically
significant autocorrelation parameters achieve the best scores, the OLS model comes in
last (although the differences between the last models is only minor). 
**** Table 5***
9. Conclusions
In this paper I have attempted to structure the thought that goes into specifying a
weight structure for network autocorrelation models. Several steps need to be taken in
the specification of an appropriate weight structure. First, the researcher has to choose
what mechanism is driving social influence: communication or comparison and/or
adjacency or non-adjacency. The choice between adjacency and non-adjacency is
especially important, because it is very difficult to empirically distinguish between
communication or comparison as the drivers of social influence. A connected choice is
related to the source of influence: do actors mimic alter’s behavior or opinion itself, or
do they mimic the adaptation of alter’s behavior or opinion? The first source is
captured by the network effects model, the second source by the network disturbances
model. 
Since actors usually have a limited influencing capacity (for instance, because the
resources required for exerting influence are limited) or a limited readiness for
accepting influence, a model choice is often made to normalize either the rows or
columns of W. Normalizing the rows decreases the influence each alter has on ego with
each additional alter. Normalizing the columns decreases the influence alter has on ego
with the number of actors influenced by alter. An additional effect of normalizing W is
that it may asymmetrize the influence structure, even though the original structure was
symmetric. 
Finally, for each mechanism of influence, each source of influence, and each
normalization, a large set of potential weight structures remains. In this paper I have
presented several of them, but many more are possible. I do not generically prefer one
of them, the choice has to be made on substantive grounds. If substantive
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considerations fail to limit the number of weight matrices to only one, or when
alternative models can not be discarded on substantive grounds, several statistical
techniques can assist the researcher in making a final choice or in testing models or
specifications against alternatives. 
Of course, it is impossible to present a complete overview. Hopefully the present
overview will incite analysts to put more thought into the specification of W, since the
usefulness of the entire approach of network autocorrelation models hinges upon it. In
this paper, I have tried to provide the researcher with the tools and the thought that go
into the specification of an appropriate weight structure. The analysis of social
influence through network autocorrelation models is promising and has proved its
potential over the years. The sensitivity of the results to the specification of weight
matrix W, the key element of these models, dictates that careful thought be used in its
construction. Unfortunately, the effort devoted by researchers to the appropriate choice
of W pales in comparison to the efforts devoted to the development of statistical and
mathematical procedures. I certainly do not question the usefulness of statistical
progress in this area (e.g., Leenders 1995, 1997), but with this paper I do want to stress
that these useful procedures lose their usefulness when applied to a model with an ill-
specified weight matrix W. Many approaches to estimating parameters in network
autocorrelation models have been devised over the years. Simulation studies have
investigated their behavior in a wide range of situations. Accurate estimates and
inferences of complex network autocorrelation models are no longer problematic with
current computer technology. But, at the end of the day, any autocorrelation model is
useless when W is not specified with explicit attentio and care.34
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FIGURE 1       Social influence.
FIGURE 2       Alternative approach to social influence.
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Tables
Table 1
Social influence among adjacent and non-adjacent actors.
Table 2
Row normalization versus column normalization.
ADJACENT ACTORS NON-ADJACENT ACTORS
Communication
Indirect communication Indirect communication
Comparison Comparison
Indirect comparison Indirect comparison
ROW NORMALIZATION COLUMN NORMALIZATION
• each outgoing contact has equal influ-
ence for each actor
• each incoming contact has equal influ-
ence for each actor
• weight proportional to outdegree • weight proportional to indegree
• total amount of accepted influence 
equal for all actors
• total amount of exerted influence equal 
for all actors
• deals with accepted/received influence • deals with exerted/executed influence44
Table 3
Network effects model for the Louisiana voting dataa
a. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at p<.05.
OLS
-- -- .31* (.10) .07 (.06) .12 (.25) .04 (.12)
const. 21.03* (4.40) 13.87* (4.67) 19.83* (4.34) 16.78 (10.06
)
19.80* (5.62)
B .01 (.08) -.00 (.07) .00 (.08) .01 (.08) .01 (.08)
C .30* (.04) .22* (.05) .28* (.04) .29* (.05) .29* (.05)
U -.11* (.04) -.10* (.04) -.11* (.04) -.11* (.04) -.11* (.04)
BPE .39* (.06) .30* (.06) .37* (.06) .38* (.06) .38* (.06)
wij
1 [] wij
2 [] wij
6 [] wij
9 []
r45
Table 4
Network disturbances model for the Louisiana voting dataa
a. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at p<.05.
.69* (.10) .53* (.13) .22 (.42) .74* (.15)
const. 26.99* (4.50) 24.98* (4.22) 21.52* (4.30) 24.51* (5.06)
B -.11 (.07) -.07 (.07) -.00 (.08) -.09 (.08)
C .37* (.05) .35* (.04) .31* (.04) .38* (.04)
U -.07* (.03) .08* (.03) -.11* (.04) -.10* (.04)
BPE .24* (.06) .30* (0.06) .38* (.06) .29* (.06)
wij
1 [] wij
2 [] wij
6 [] wij
9 []
r46
Table 5
Order of W-matrices and autocorrelation models according to AIC
Weight
matrix
AIC Order
within model
Overall
order
Network
effects
model
439.12 1 3
445.52 2 5
446.78 4 8
446.44 3 6
Network
disturbances
model
431.92 1 1
436.33 2 2
446.69 4 7
440.95 3 4
OLS -- 446.82 -- 9
wij
1 []
wij
2 []
wij
6 []
wij
9 []
wij
1 []
wij
2 []
wij
6 []
wij
9 []